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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA

J.F., a minor child,

Plaintiff.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No. C04-5891RJB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Noted for November 25, 2005

This matter has been referred to Magistrate Judge J. Kelley Arnold pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Magistrate Rule MJR 4(a)(4) and as authorized by Mathews, Secretary of H.E.W. v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). This matter has been fully briefed by the parties.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jason Freeland is currently 19 years old, however this case is focused on plaintiff's alleged disability when he was several years younger. Plaintiff did not like school and thus, his attendance was a chronic problem. Plaintiff's mother testified that her son was enrolled in special education classes since junior high school. Plaintiff testified that he could read books that were like cartoons, (Tr. 523); he was able to add and subtract, but could not multiply and divide. He stated that his special education teacher assisted him and three to four other children in performing their work, but reading the questions to them and if they do not know the answers, gives them the answers, writes the answers and they copy the answer from the teacher. (Tr. 525) He stated that he had friends at school, had one friend in his neighborhood, but it had been one year since he visited with him. (Tr. 526-527) He stated for the past year that he did not want to go out of his house and he stays home reads Anime books and plays video games. (Tr. 527)

On August 26, 1997, when plaintiff was 11 years old, an application was filed on plaintiff's behalf seeking Child's SSI disability; plaintiff was found disabled as of August 1, 1997, based on mental

1	retardation and attention and concentration deficits (Tr. 31). Subsequently, plaintiff underwent a
2	continuing disability review and on March 1, 2001, plaintiff was found to have experienced medical
3	improvement and his disability ceased March 2001 (Tr. 31). Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration,
4	which was granted (Tr. 63-65) and he requested a hearing (Tr. 66-67). On September 12, 2002, an
5	administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted the first hearing and heard testimony from three witnesses: Ms.
6	Freeland, plaintiff's mother; Anna Freeland, plaintiff's sister; and plaintiff, who was represented by counsel
7	(Tr. 536-59). On January 7, 2003, a second hearing was held, in which the ALJ heard testimony from two
8	witnesses: plaintiff, who was represented by counsel; and the medical expert, Larry Hart, Ph.D., a
9	psychologist (Tr. 536-59).
10	On August 11, 2003, the ALJ found plaintiff was a 16 year old boy with asthma and a learning

On August 11, 2003, the ALJ found plaintiff was a 16 year old boy with asthma and a learning disorder, which no longer medically or functionally met or equaled the severity of any impairments listed in the Listing of Impairments. *See* 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (Tr. 19-29). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 6-8), making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.981, 422.210 (2005).

Plaintiff now brings this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision terminating his SSI benefits. Plaintiff alleges the following errors were made by the ALJ:

- (i) the ALJ failed to accurately apply the childhood mental disorder listings and the functional equivalent regulations;
- (ii) the ALJ erred when he discounted the opinion of the state agency consultants without providing specific and legitimate reasons;
 - (iii) the ALJ improperly ignored test results obtained in Dr. Chalstrom's report; and
- (iv) the ALJ erred in rejecting and discounting the testimony of lay witnesses and teachers.

 After careful consideration of the Administrative Record and the parties' memoranda, the undersigned find the administration erred when it failed to specifically consider whether or not plaintiff's condition met or equaled Section 112.02 of the Listings. This court recommends that the Court REMAND the matter to the administration for further review.

DISCUSSION

1	The Commissioner's decision must be upheld if the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and the
2	decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. <u>Drouin v. Sullivan</u> , 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9 th
3	Cir. 1992); Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence is such relevant
4	evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales,
5	402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); <u>Fife v. Heckler</u> , 767 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9 th Cir. 1985). It is more than a scintilla
6	but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9 th Cir. 1975); Carr v.
7	Sullivan, 772 F. Supp. 522, 525 (E.D. Wash. 1991). If the evidence admits of more than one rational
8	interpretation, this Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision. <u>Allen v. Heckler</u> , 749 F.2d 577, 579
9	(9 th Cir. 1984).
10	After reviewing the matter, the court finds the administration erred when the ALJ limited his review
11	to only Section 112.05 of the Listings. Plaintiff specifically argues the ALJ failed to consider Jason's
12	claim under Section 112.02 – Organic Mental Disorders. The regulations define an Organic Mental
13	Disorder, as follows:
14	Abnormalities in perception, cognition, affect, or behavior associated with dysfunction of
15	the brain. The history and physical examination or laboratory tests, including psychological or neuropsychological tests, demonstrate or support the presence of an organic factor
16	judged to be etiologically related to the abnormal mental state and associated deficit or loss of specific cognitive abilities, or affective changes, or loss of previously acquired functional
17	abilities.
18	The required level of severity for this Listing is met when the requirements in both A and B are satisfied.
19	A. Medically documented persistence of at least one of the following:
20	 Developmental arrest, delay or regression; or Disorientation to time and place; or
21	3. Memory impairment, either short-term (inability to learn new information), intermediate, or long-term (inability to remember information that was known sometime in the past); or

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- 4. Perceptual or thinking disturbance (e.g., hallucinations, delusions, illusions, or paranoid thinking); or
- 5. Disturbance in personality (e.g., apathy, hostility); or
- 6. Disturbance in mood (e.g., mania, depression); or
- 7. Emotional lability (e.g., sudden crying); or
- 8. Impairment of impulse control (e.g., disinhibited social behavior, explosive temper outbursts); or
- 9. Impairment of cognitive function, as measured by clinically timely standardized psychological testing; or
- 10. Disturbance of concentration, attention, or judgment;

27 **AND**

B. Select the appropriate age group to evaluate the severity of the impairment:

2. For children (age 3 to attainment of age 18), resulting in at least two of the following: a. Marked impairment in age-appropriate cognitive/ communicative function, documented

by medical findings (including consideration of historical and other information from parents or other individuals who have knowledge of the child, when such information is needed and available) and including, if necessary, the results of appropriate standardized psychological tests . . .; or

- b. Marked impairment in age-appropriate social functioning, documented by history and medical findings (including consideration of information from parents or other individuals who have knowledge of the child, when such information is needed and available) and including, if necessary, the results of appropriate standardized tests; or
- c. Marked impairment in age-appropriate personal functioning, documented by history and medical findings (including consideration of information from parents or other individuals who have knowledge of the child . . . and including, if necessary, appropriate standardized tests; or
- d. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.

Defendant's response acknowledges that the ALJ did not specifically discuss plaintiff's condition in the context of Section 112.02, but argues the claim is "completely speculative and not supported by the medical record." The court disagrees. The record contains evidence supporting plaintiff's claim.

Dr. Hart, a psychologist who testified as the medical expert at the second administrative hearing, opined that repeat psychological testing made it difficult to accurately assess plaintiff's IQ. He stated that generally since plaintiff had been tested repeatedly that the last testing of his IQ in 2002, by Dr. Neims was probably the best test (Tr. 542). Because he found the discrepancy in the test results confusing, he averaged the 97, 2001 and 2002 psychological testing scores and concluded that plaintiff's mean verbal IQ was 76, his mean performance IQ was 78 and his mean full scale IQ was 75 (Tr. 547). Dr. Hart opined that the completeness of the background information, the ability of the parent to articulate and communicate about the child, the behavioral observations and the history were all critical to the diagnosis and formulation of a diagnosis and report (Tr. 552). Dr. Hart indicated at the conclusion of the hearing that plaintiff should be on medication because he was obviously organically compromised and would function better on medication (Tr. 557).

Standardized test scores from the Woodcock Johnson Test and Wechsler Individual Achievement Test document that plaintiff is functioning more than two standard deviations below the mean. When he was in 9th grade, comments written on his Individualized Education Plan state, "according to the Woodcock Johnson Test, he has a 4th grade reading level, and a 3rd to 4th grade math level. In 10th grade, the Woodcock Johnson Test indicated a 4.3 grade reading level, 4th grade math level, a 2nd grade written language level, a 2nd grade reading comprehension level, 1st to 2nd grade basic writing skills level

and a 3rd to 4th grade written expression level. His overall total achievement level was at a 3.6 grade equivalency level (Tr. 391). Dr. Chalstrom, a consultative examiner retained by the Social Security Administration, conducted the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test. His test scores demonstrated that plaintiff's cognitive abilities were at a 3rd grade reading level, 3rd grade math level and a 2nd grade spelling level (Tr. 345). Additionally, notes in his Individualized Education Plan document his difficulties in concentration persistence and pace. In September 1999 when he was in 8th grade, comments written on his Individualized Education Program (IEP), stated, "textbooks, materials, assignments written at 2.0 grade level, receives 1:1 and small group instruction, longer time on tests and assignments and oral responses to tests as needed" (Tr. 156). According to his 2001, evaluation by the Bremerton School District, "he still requires a great deal of supervision and assistance in order to be successful", (Tr. 391), in 8th grade it was stated, "testing with accommodations maximum length of time, frequent breaks, directions being read to him". (Tr. 159) If we combine additional supervision required at school with the statements from Mark Dickerman, the witness who testified at his continuing disability hearing "needs step by step help, needs one-on-one attention" and his sister's testimony that he gets distracted when performing household chores, there is credible evidence that he has an extreme limitation regarding concentration, persistence and pace. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the matter should be remanded for further review. On remand the matter should be assigned to a different ALJ. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections. *See also* Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on **November 25, 2005**, as noted in the caption.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2005.

_/s/ J. Kelley Arnold J. Kelley Arnold

J. Kelley Arnold U.S. Magistrate Judge

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